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1.  Introduction 
 
Economic and financial liberalization in India, as it had been argued in various places, 
was a reaction to the imminent external crisis that the country was experiencing by the 
beginning of 1990s. The reasons put forth by the ruling government at the time have been 
contested in different forums and it has also been stated that the reforms should have begun 
much earlier. Nonetheless, whatever might have been the driving force behind the economic 
and financial reforms, there is little doubt that the country was unprepared to adopt it at the 
time.  In fact, the polity expected that the depth and spread of various other distortions in the 
country would automatically correct themselves once the more prominent sources are dealt 
with.  For example, while trade and financial reforms aimed at removing some of the 
distortions responsible for the known maladies within the formal sector, the evolving 
conditions of the large unorganized sector were little known to the academic and policy 
communities in the country, despite recognition of the fact that the unorganized sector 
employed approximately 90% of the working population including those in the agricultural 
sector (NCEUS, 2009).  Thus, the reforms brought in a watershed in the way various sectors 
in the ‗formal‘ economy functioned and presently offers a natural experiment to observe if the 
changes were significant enough for some of the crucial sectors in the country in the presence 
of large informal counterparts.  In this connection, we focus on a specific aspect of the rural 
economy that continues to be of prime importance in the development discourses in India and 
might offer related inferences for other developing countries.        
In India, the financial liberalization was implemented at a time when the rural credit 
market was marked by imperfections and fragmentations. Therefore, much of the benefits of 
liberalization in terms of coverage, ease of access and lower as well as fairer repayment 
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conditions failed to reach the rural poor.  It is well-known that sections of the population in a 
developing country, particularly those in the labour surplus agricultural sector, are 
comparatively more vulnerable to the credit malpractices compared to their urban 
counterparts.  Hence, the burden of indebtedness in rural India was on those who resorted to 
informal credit institutions as the most important source to borrow from.1  Despite major 
structural changes in the credit institutions and forms of rural credit, the engagement of the 
rural masses with the informal credit market has been one of the most exploitative and 
persistent features of rural India (Basu, 2006). In this connection, Jeromi (2007) for example, 
discusses the undesirable aspects of informal money lending in Kerala and its overall impact 
on the society.  Needless to mention, the predicament of rural borrowers is a historical 
phenomenon in India as one observes from earlier documents. Among others, Sinha (1976) 
presents a worrisome account of the rule of moneylenders in rural societies in Dhanbad.  In 
the same vein, the Rural Finance Access Survey (RFAS, 2003) indicates that 70 percent of 
marginal and landless farmers do not have bank accounts and about 87 percent have no 
access to credit from a formal source.  The study also found that 48 percent of marginal and 
landless farmers have borrowed from an informal source at least once in the previous twelve 
months, at interest rates averaging 48 percent per year.  On the other hand, National Sample 
Survey Organization (2006) reports that the informal sources account for about 44 percent of 
outstanding loans taken by unorganised manufacturing enterprises.  
Consequently, efforts have been made to disentangle borrowers from the clutches of 
informal lenders.  In addition, some of the measures that the government resorted to in an 
                                         
 
1 Informal credit institutions imply those that are not regulated by public authority. The terms and conditions 
associated with such loan are personalized and vary in accordance with the bargaining power of  the borrower on a 
case-to-case basis. 
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attempt to arrest the adverse effects of liberalization included expansion of the institutional 
structure and coverage of formal-sector lending institutions, initiation of directed lending, and 
providing for concessional or subsidized credit (Basu, 2006).  In the period between 
nationalization and liberalization, banks had opened more rural branches in states having 
fewer branches per capita as of 1961.  This trend was, however, reversed after liberalization 
(Burgess and Pande, 2003).  The number of branches of scheduled commercial banks, in rural 
areas, increased from 1833 in 1969 to 34791 in 1990.  On the other hand, between 1990 and 
2012 only 862 new branches were opened (RBI, 2012).  However, note that, according to the 
Reserve Bank of India (2006), during 2005-06 the credit advanced by scheduled commercial 
banks rose by 36 percent. The government also accepted the recommendations of the task 
force formed under Prof. Vaidyanathan in a bid to revive the short-term rural co-operative 
banking institutions. In view of their importance as lenders, supporting banks were 
encouraged to merge with the regional rural banks (RRBs) that they sponsored, state-wise, in 
order to strengthen them. By 2006, the Government had issued notifications providing for 
amalgamation of 93 RRBs into 27 new RRBs, sponsored by 15 banks in 12 States (RBI, 
2006).  
The EPW Research Foundation (2007) subsequently shows how the objective of a 
rapid credit expansion is stifled without the expansion of the rural branch network of the 
dominant public sector banks. In fact, studies have found a positive impact of branch 
expansion in rural areas and greater positive impact of access to finance on poverty (Banerjee 
and Newman, 1993; Burgess et. al., 2005). However, the steady reduction in the number of 
branches in rural areas and increasing demand by banks for collaterals tends to invalidate and 
wither the benefits that were envisaged by policy makers before bank nationalization (Nair, 
2000).  The reversals were so severe that it led the RBI (2006, pp. 55) to report that ―despite 
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the spread of banking facilities in rural areas and availability of bank finance at reasonable 
rates, farmers in several areas are still in distress‖, and proposed the formation of a working 
group to suggest measures for assisting distressed farmers, including provision of financial 
counselling services and introduction of a specific Credit Guarantee Scheme under the 
Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC) Act. 
 
The All India Debt and Investment Survey (AIDIS) by NSSO also reveals that the loans taken 
from moneylenders in the total credit stock of rural households have increased from 17.5 
percent in 1991 to 29.6 percent in 2002.  This indicates an increase in indebtedness of rural 
households over the past decade to informal lending institutions.  However, this can also 
mean an increased access to credit. According to AIDIS (1991), just 16 percent of rural 
households had formal loan outstanding.  Based on the World Bank-NCAER Rural Financial 
Access Survey (2003), the corresponding number was 21 percent (Basu, 2006). 
 
Several other factors, such as the amount of processing time required to obtain the loan and 
the bribes that need to be paid makes access to credit from the formal sector a difficult 
alternative.  Evidently, it raises the effective cost of borrowing for the poor credit-starved 
households.  According to RFAS (2003, Table 1), 26.8 percent households have reported 
paying bribes for getting a loan from banks.  Bribe paid as a percent of the loan amount was 
10.1 percent for banks, 18.2 percent for RRBs and 19.9 percent for co-operatives. For the 
RRBs, which were established by the government of India through an ordinance and then by 
a legislation to improve the credit accessibility to the poor, the average time taken to process 
a loan application was as long as 28.5 weeks. Most of the loans given by commercial banks, 
RRBs, and cooperatives required collaterals. 89 percent of households who borrowed from 
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RRBs, and 87 percent of households who borrowed from commercial banks reported that 
they had to provide collateral. The value of collaterals required as a proportion of the loan, 
however, remains relatively low in the case of banks and RRBs, at under 10 percent, but high 
in the case of government schemes (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Sources of Formal Borrowing and the Associated Costs (2003) 
Indicators Banks RRBs Cooperatives Government 
Schemes 
Others 
Interest rate (median) % 
p.a. 12.5 11 11 14 14 
Loan amount received as 
% of amount applied 91.8 88.2 83.5 86.6 93.9 
Percentage of households 
reporting bribes 26.8 27 9.7 27.27 23.21 
 
Bribe as % of amount 
approved 
10.1 18.2 19.9 42.3 8.3 
Time taken to process a 
loan application (weeks) 33 28.5 24 8.9 14.3 
Collateral required (as % 
of loan) 87 89.3 72.9 58.3 83.1 
Value of collateral (as % of 
loan) 9.1 9.5 11 26.8 24.3 
  Source: RFAS, 2003. 
 
The performance of the scheduled commercial banks and other bank based financial 
intermediaries since nationalization, and up to the year 2000 are presented in table 2.  It is 
evident that the priority sector lending 2, which had been an important agenda of the 
                                         
 
2 Advances to Priority Sectors consist of  the advances to (1) agriculture and allied activities, (2) small scale industries 
including loans for setting up industrial estates, (3) small road and water transport operators, (4) small business, (5) 
professional and self-employed persons, (6) retail trade, (7) state sponsored organisations for scheduled 
castes/scheduled tribes, (8) education, (9) housing, (10) Self  Help Groups (SHGs)/Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), (11) consumption loans granted under the consumption credit scheme, (12) net funds 
provided to sponsored Regional Rural Banks, (13) advances to software industry units having credit limit up to Rs. 1 
crore, (14) advances to food and agro-based processing sector which do not satisfy Small Scale Industry norms, (15) 
Credit offered to weaker sections under different schemes and (16) investment in venture capital. 
  
 
 
7 
government since 1968, has suffered a setback after liberalization. Priority sector lending by 
scheduled commercial banks as a proportion of total credit advanced increased significantly 
from 14 percent in 1969 to 34.4 percent in 1993. However, between 1993 and 2011, it 
declined to 33.9 percent. 
Table 2: The Extent of Commercial Banking in India, various years. 
Indicators June 
1969 1993 1995 1999  2000 2011
No. of Commercial Banks 89 276 284 303 297 169 
(a) Scheduled Commercial 
Banks 73 272 281 302 297 165 
Of which: Regional Rural 
Banks - 196 196 196 196 82 
(b) Non-Scheduled 
Commercial Banks 16 4 3 1 - 4 
Number of Bank Offices in 
India 8262 61169 62367 64939 
6541
2 92063 
(a) Rural 1833 35389 33004 32857 32734 34208 
Population per office (in 
thousands) 64 14 15 15 15 13.1 
Deposits of scheduled 
commercial banks in India 
(Rs. in Crore) 
4646 274938 386859 714025 
8515
93 
520796
9 
Credit of scheduled 
commercial banks in India 
(Rs. in Crore) 
3599 154838 211560 368837 
4540
69 
394208
2 
Scheduled commercial banks' 
Advances to Priority Sector 
(Rs. in Crore) 
504 51739 69209 126309 
1557
79 133733 
Share of Priority Sector 
Advances in Total Credit of 
scheduled commercial banks 
(%) 
14 34.4 33.7 35.3 35.4 33.9 
Share of Priority Sector 
Advances in Total Non-Food 
Credit of scheduled 
commercial banks (%) 
15 36.1 35.8 37 37.4 34.5 
Source: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin (various years) 
 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
  
 
 
8 
Based on some of these facts and figures we attempt to discuss the degree of financial 
inclusiveness of the rural population in various states of India.  It should be borne in mind that 
the rural sector in India is largely composed of the agricultural sector and the rural formal and 
informal industries, albeit the share of the formal sector is quite thin. Therefore, in order to 
comprehend the role of the current financial system, we separately examine the two major 
sectors in the rural areas, namely, agriculture and the unorganised manufacturing.  While the 
literature talks extensively about the supply of credit to agriculture (Basu 2006, Chavan 2005, 
Jagan Mohan 2004), an in-depth analysis of the rural unorganised manufacturing sector 
remains somewhat neglected. The chapter also attempts to fill this gap.   
With unorganised manufacturing sector emerging as a substantive and growing sector 
within the total manufacturing sector per se, its contribution to the rural economy can hardly 
be neglected. According to the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) of India, during 
2005-06, an estimated 17 million unorganized manufacturing enterprises were in operation at 
the all-India level, of which 71% were located in rural areas.  This bears out the fact that the 
rural unorganized manufacturing enterprises play a non-trivial role in the development of the 
rural economy. This primarily motivates us to discuss the financial linkages and inclusiveness 
of rural organizations outside of agriculture. 
The study is organized as follows. We discuss the data sources in Section 2 followed 
by a brief analysis of the agricultural sector. In section 3 we discuss the rural unorganised 
manufacturing sector as the focus of this study.  Section 4 deals with volatility in the informal 
sector as a whole and income volatility in the unorganized manufacturing sector in particular. 
Section 5 discusses micro-credit organizations as a link between formal credit and the 
informal manufacturing units in rural India and concludes. 
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2.  Agriculture and Finance 
Data Sources 
The data for this study is obtained from the 62nd round of Unorganised Manufacturing 
Enterprise Survey by National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), All India Debt and 
Investment Survey by NSSO, the survey conducted by the National Council of Applied 
Economic Research and the World Bank of India (a survey of 6000 households and micro-
enterprises in two states - Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh), Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
and National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD).  As stated above, we 
begin by discussing the financial issues with the agricultural sector and subsequently that of 
the rural unorganized manufacturing sector. We define ‗rural‘ unorganized manufacturing 
sector as those unorganized manufacturing enterprises3 (OAME, NDME and DMEs taken 
together) that the NSSO reports to be located in rural areas. We also follow the same 
definition of ‗rural areas‘ as followed by NSSO. 
 
The Agricultural Sector 
There are various reasons why farm households need loans.  Ray (1998) has identified 
demand for fixed capital at the household level to start up new production or to improve and 
modernise existing production techniques. On the other hand, it is also observed that the 
demand for working capital comes mainly from the need to buy raw materials such as seeds, 
fertilizers, pesticides, to carry the output to the market and as consumption credit, comprising 
the three important sources of demand for credit. However, there are several bottlenecks in the 
                                         
 
3 The unorganized manufacturing sector is defined by NSSO as: “all manufacturing enterprises except those 
registered under section 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of Factories Act, 1948 and Bidi and Cigar Workers (conditions of 
employment) Act, 1966 and, all manufacturing enterprises except those run by Government (Central Government, 
State Governments, Local Bodies)/Public Sector Enterprises” (see appendix 2 for the various sub-clauses under 
Factories Act, 1948). 
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credit supply chain. Formal lending institutions are less keen to lend to the poor because 
agriculture is inherently risky, and if the crop fails there is very little option through which the 
farmer can repay the loan. To combat this problem the institutional agencies demand 
collateral, but the collateral offered by poor farmers are often not acceptable to banks. For, 
example a landless labourer might offer his labour as collateral (which an informal lender will 
accept), but a formal financial institution like a bank obviously cannot accept it.  It also clearly 
suggests that the practice of bonded labour continues in relation to informal financial facilities 
in rural India.  Again, a small farmer may offer his land as collateral but the bank might not 
find it profitable because the cost of selling it in case of a default could be too high (ibid.).  
This is over and above the usual moral hazard of monitoring and policing a borrower that 
restricts the formal financial institutions from offering extensive credit facilities.  Much of 
these aspects has been discussed in elegant detail in Basu (1997) and therefore do not require 
further deliberation. 
  
Nevertheless, the statistics of indebtedness in farm households in India shows greater reliance 
on institutional credit over the last few decades although the share of moneylenders continues 
to be reasonably high.  But during the last decade there has been a decline in the share of 
institutional credit as a source of debt in farm households.  For the farm households, the 
proportionate share of debt from institutional sources fell from 66.3 percent in 1991 to 61.1 in 
2002 (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Percentage share of debt of cultivator households from different source of credit in 
India (1951-2002) 
Source of Credit 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2002 
Institutional 7.3 18.7 31.7 63.2 66.3 61.1 
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Cooperative 
Societies/Banks 3.3 2.6 22 29.8 30 30.2 
Commercial Banks 0.9 0.6 2.4 28.8 35.2 26.3 
Non-Institutional 92.7 81.3 66.3 36.8 30.6 38.9 
Money Lenders 69.7 49.2 36.1 16.1 17.5 26.8 
Unspecified - - - - 3.1 - 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 857, dated 25.02.2011. 
 
Fig 1 also displays the proportion of loan taken by cultivator households from institutional 
and non-institutional sources.  Loans taken from institutional sources show a steady increase 
in the total loan taken by these households, however, the share of formal sources has declined 
since 1991.  The clear withdrawal of the formal lending institutions from rural areas, as 
shown above, after liberalization, has been explained as a systematic design to remain 
profitable. It is well-known that borrowers in rural areas often do not have sufficient assets to 
provide as collaterals. Consequently, in case of non-recovery of the loan it leads to loss/NPA 
(non performing assets) for the banks with reportedly technical restraints in capturing and 
selling off the collaterals. Moreover, under the direct finance schemes of lending, the crop 
produce is regularly kept as collateral. This becomes extremely risky as, in case of a crop 
failure the entire amount of loan proves to be bad debt for the bank. The lending institutions 
argue that in a bid to remain competitive, the banks have started to look away from the rural 
sector as part of their strategic decisions. 
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Figure 1: Percentage share of debt of cultivator households by 
different  source of credit  in India 
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Source: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin (Various years) 
 
A study of the distribution of farm households across states by source of loan (Table 4) shows 
that Andhra Pradesh accounts for the highest number of farmer households indebted to 
moneylenders (at 57 percent) followed by Tamil Nadu (at 52 percent). In states where the 
dominance of moneylenders is low, traders emerge as a substitute for lending agencies.  
Traders account for 88 percent, 51 percent, 30 percent, and 70 percent of loans contracted in 
Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, Mizoram and Sikkim, respectively.  At the all-India level, 29 
percent of farm households were indebted to moneylenders whereas only 27 percent took 
loans from banks.  
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Table 4: Number per 100 distribution of Indebted Farmer Households, by Source of Loans 
and States (2003) 
State Govt Co-op 
society Bank 
Money 
lender Trader 
Relatives 
& 
Friends 
Doctor, 
Lawyer Others 
Andhra 
Pradesh 3 20 31 57 9 6 1 4 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 4 0 10 0 33 49 0 21 
Assam 3 3 9 10 17 54 1 6 
Bihar 2 4 17 44 5 26 2 7 
Chhattisgarh 2 37 27 20 17 12 2 5 
Gujarat 0 40 23 8 10 29 1 1 
Haryana 2 44 30 29 9 9 2 1 
Himachal 
Pradesh 5 24 28 5 22 32 2 4 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 4 1 4 1 88 5 0 0 
Jharkhand 6 0 38 22 8 28 1 1 
Karnataka 2 23 32 34 5 12 1 3 
Kerala 8 46 42 16 6 12 1 5 
Madhya 
Pradesh 4 37 23 22 23 17 2 2 
Maharashtra 2 61 29 7 6 11 2 4 
Manipur 4 0 2 25 11 57 0 6 
Meghalaya 2 0 0 6 0 91 0 0 
Mizoram 10 2 21 0 30 37 0 0 
Nagaland 4 2 14 0 51 28 0 0 
Orissa 2 30 36 23 4 16 0 3 
Punjab 1 38 19 28 18 21 1 2 
Rajasthan 2 15 21 40 23 14 2 2 
Sikkim 6 0 12 5 70 14 0 2 
Tamil Nadu 3 33 23 52 2 11 0 2 
Tripura 11 3 32 2 29 20 0 4 
Uttar Pradesh 4 13 30 26 9 28 3 4 
Uttaranchal 8 17 40 7 5 25 0 7 
West Bengal 10 19 22 15 29 23 2 4 
Group of UTs 9 15 18 30 9 31 0 1 
India 3 26 27 29 12 18 2 3 
Source: NSSO (2003) 
 
Contextualizing this data with the objectives of both nationalization and liberalization leads 
one to conclude that those sections of rural India that heavily depends on agriculture for their 
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livelihood remains extremely starved for credit. Moreover, the share of credit from 
cooperative societies decreased by 7 percentage points to 21.6, during the same period (Table 
5).  This drop was however, compensated partly by the rise in the share of commercial banks 
(5.7 percentage points) and partly by direct government interventions (2.1 percentage points).  
Among the non-institutional agencies, the share of debt to professional money-lenders rose 
slightly from 8.3 percent in 1981 to 10.5 percent in 1991.  In the case of cultivator 
households, the share of debt from co-operative societies/banks during 1981-91 decreased 
and this seems to have mainly affected the share for all rural households. On the other hand, 
the share of debt from professional money-lenders is reported to have increased for cultivator 
households. A sharp rise of 10 percentage points was recorded in the share of debt from 
commercial banks in the case of non-cultivator households.   
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Table 5: Distribution of cash-debt according to credit agencies, 1971-91 (%) 
Credit Agency 
Rural Households 
Cultivators Non-cultivators All Household 
1971 1981 1991 1971 1981 1991 1971 1981 1991 
Institutional 31.7 63.2 66.3 10.8 36.7 55.3 29.2 61.2 64 
Government 7.1 3.9 5.7 3.4 4.5 7.6 6.7 4 6.1 
Co-operative 
Society 22 29.8 23.6 6.0 13.9 14.2 20.1 28.6 21.6 
Commercial 
Banks 2.4 28.8 35.2 0.8 17.3 27.9 2.2 28 33.7 
Insurance 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 - 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Other Institutional 
Agencies - 1.1 - - 3.4 - - 1.6 
Non- 
Institutional 68.3 36.8 30.6 89.2 63.3 40.6 70.8 38.8 32.7 
Landlord 8.1 3.7 3.7 12.6 8.4 4.9 8.6 4 4 
Agriculturist 
Moneylender 23 8.3 6.8 23.8 11.4 8.2 23.1 8.6 7.1 
Professional 
Moneylender 13.1 7.8 10.7 18.7 13.4 9.8 13.8 8.3 10.5 
Trader 8.4 3.1 2.2 10.9 5.8 3.6 8.7 3.4 2.5 
Relatives/Friends 13.1 8.7 4.6 19 14.4 8.8 13.8 9 5.5 
Others 2.6 5.2 2.6 4.2 9.9 5.4 2.8 5.5 3.2 
Unspecified - - 3.1 - - 4 - - 3.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: RBI Bulletin various issues. 
 
Among the major sources of credit agencies, the rural cooperative banks were guided by the 
motivation of improving absorptive capacity of the credit delivery system. They were 
intended to facilitate credit flow for promotion and growth of agriculture and integrated rural 
development. They were also expected to support all other allied economic activities in rural 
areas, promoting sustainable rural development.  However, their functioning has continued to 
deteriorate over the period and as of 2009 (Table 6), loans issued as a percentage of their total 
working capital was as low as 6.5 percent for the district co-operative banks and 16.75 
percent for the state co-operative banks, both for the North-East regions of the country.  At 
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the all-India level, loans granted by District and State Cooperative Banks accounted for less 
than 50 percent of their total working capital. Punjab however, was a case where the state co-
operative banks issued loans more than their total working capital. 
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Table 6: Loans issued by State Co-operative and District Co-operative banks as a proportion 
of their total working capital, by regions, 2009 (%) 
Regions District Co-operative Banks State Co-operative Banks 
Haryana 56.3 81.65 
Delhi N.A. 24.02 
Chandigarh N.A. 2.94 
Himachal 
Pradesh 24.4 21.94 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 10.5 5.26 
Punjab 78.4 125.05 
Rajasthan 56.9 48.82 
North Zone 58 69.86 
Arunachal 
Pradesh N.A. 0.00 
Assam 6.5 35.44 
Manipur N.A. 17.06 
Meghalaya N.A. 6.80 
Mizoram N.A. 13.56 
Nagaland N.A. 16.03 
Tripura N.A. 12.56 
North East 
Zone 6.5 16.75 
Andaman  &  
Nicobar N.A. 8.05 
Bihar 14.1 16.39 
Orissa 2.5 45.14 
Sikkim 39.6 17.72 
West Bengal 35.6 27.99 
East Zone 32.5 32.62 
Chhattisgarh 56.4 13.68 
Madhya 
Pradesh 51.4 66.73 
Uttar Pradesh 47.1 77.61 
Central Zone 48.5 60.14 
Goa N.A. 47.12 
Gujarat 41 32.64 
Maharashtra 32.9 40.36 
West Zone 34.6 39.43 
Andhra Pradesh 32.4 44.21 
Karnataka 58.9 52.60 
Kerala 71.3 48.70 
Puducherry N.A. 85.40 
Tamil Nadu 77.3 47.33 
South Zone 62.4 48.72 
Total 47.8 48.97 
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Note: N.A. = Not Available, Source: Own calculations from NABARD data. 
 
To provide support for the rural population that struggles to arrange for the minimum start-up 
capital to initiate production, the government through an ordinance and later by legislation, 
announced the inception of the Regional Rural Banks (RRBs). A study of their performance 
reveals that though there has been an increase in the ground level credit disbursed by the 
RRBs, they are still out-performed by the cooperative banks (Table 7). This seems to be a 
commendable achievement on the part of the Co-operative Banks.  It also confirms that the 
purpose of setting up the RRBs remains far from fulfilled.  Note that, the general situation in 
the agricultural sector is likely to affect the rural credit alternatives in various ways, which is 
why the financial inter linkage can be of significance.  On the production side, however, 
Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) previously argued that whenever there has been a productivity 
increase in the Indian agriculture, the consequent higher rural wage has discouraged rural 
industrialization.  Thus, the supply side effect could not be compensated by greater demand 
for local goods through the increased income effect.  Currently, the provision of rural 
employment guarantee schemes for all the states and union territories should also impart an 
artificial upward pressure on the rural wages and affect industrialization.  Nevertheless, the 
demand effect may alone be strong enough to invite local industries.   
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Table 7: State-wise Ground Level Credit (GLC) disbursed by Co-Operative and Regional 
Rural Banks as a Proportion of Total Credit Disbursed by these Institutions for Production 
(Crop Loan) states, regions and India (% and Rs. Lakh) 
States/UTs/Region 
2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
Cooperative 
Bank RRB 
Cooperative 
Bank RRB 
Cooperative 
Bank RRB 
Chandigarh 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Delhi 100 0 100 0 100 0 
Haryana 74.6 25.4 71.6 28.4 68.7 31.3 
Himachal Pradesh 72.3 27.7 77.6 22.4 63.0 37.0 
Jammu and Kashmir 40.4 59.6 37.6 62.4 0.9 99.1 
Punjab 87.1 12.9 87.6 12.4 84.5 15.5 
Rajasthan 56.2 43.8 54.8 45.2 57.7 42.3 
Northern Region 76.2 23.8 74.6 25.4 71.7 28.3 
Arunachal Pradesh 0 100 0 100 5.5 94.5 
Assam 2.8 97.2 4.3 95.7 0.5 99.5 
Manipur 0.0 100.0 0 0 100 0 
Meghalaya 25.7 74.3 18.0 82.0 46.1 53.9 
Mizoram 15.3 84.7 0.0 100.0 1.9 98.1 
Nagaland 69.8 30.2 74.0 26.0 93.1 6.9 
Tripura 1.8 98.2 1.8 98.2 1.8 98.2 
Sikkim 100 0 100.0 0.0 100 0 
North Eastern 
Region 6.4 93.6 8.9 91.1 7.4 92.6 
Bihar 18.7 81.3 17.4 82.6 19.5 80.5 
Jharkhand 0 100 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Orissa 77.2 22.8 83.2 16.8 85.9 14.1 
West Bengal 65.9 34.1 70.1 29.9 69.9 30.1 
Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands 69.8 30.2 100 0 100 0 
Eastern Region 51.5 48.5 59.5 40.5 61.9 38.1 
Madhya Pradesh 62.8 37.2 66.6 33.4 69.7 30.3 
Chhattisgarh 73.0 27.0 77.7 22.3 74.8 25.2 
Uttar Pradesh 28.6 71.4 29.9 70.1 31.5 68.5 
Uttarakhand 77.5 22.5 79.9 20.1 85.3 14.7 
Central Region 44.2 55.8 48.0 52.0 51.8 48.2 
Dadra and Nagar 
Haveli 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Daman and Diu 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Gujarat 81.6 18.4 82.0 18.0 81.3 18.7 
Goa 100 0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Maharashtra 92.8 7.2 93.3 6.7 93.0 7.0 
Western Region 87.2 12.8 89.0 11.0 88.7 11.3 
Andhra Pradesh 40.9 59.1 51.3 48.7 52.9 47.1 
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Karnataka 60.1 39.9 53.9 46.1 50.0 50.0 
Kerala 68.3 31.7 66.4 33.6 36.0 64.0 
Lakshadweep 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Puducherry 85.2 14.8 26.6 73.4 14.0 86.0 
Tamil Nadu 64.6 35.4 62.4 37.6 56.7 43.3 
Southern Region 58.9 41.1 58.4 41.6 50.1 49.9 
India 4023003 2241269 5694569 2980236 6452724.41 3780824 
Source: NABARD 
3.  The Rural Unorganized Manufacturing Sector 
There are not enough studies on the credit options available to the unorganised sector. 
The unorganised manufacturing enterprises that are located in rural areas produce the same 
goods as their urban counterparts.  In fact, NSSO gives the same industry groups for both the 
rural and urban enterprises. In earlier attempts, Marjit and Kar (2011) model various forms of 
interactions between the formal and the informal sector using empirical observations 
available from the NSSO.  Among other things, they show that the informal wage may 
depend critically on the degree of capital mobility between the formal and the informal 
sectors, when there is a greater degree of homogeneity between the goods produced in formal 
and informal units spread across regions.  It also suggests that depending upon sectoral 
complementarity, mobility of capital may raise the informal wages. Notwithstanding such 
possibilities, the credit scarcity remains a major problem for this sector. The need for larger 
start-up capital (compared to agriculture) makes this sector more dependent on the vagaries 
of credit agencies.  According to NSSO, in 2005-06 the majority of rural unorganised 
manufacturing enterprises (42.4 percent) reported shortage of capital as the most crucial 
problem. A meagre 3 percent and 2 percent rural manufacturing enterprise received 
institutional and non-institutional loans, respectively. 
A state-wise analysis of unorganised manufacturing enterprises shows that the 
proportion of enterprises obtaining institutional loan was highest in Dadra and Nagar Haveli, 
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which was 23 percent, and the proportion of enterprises obtaining loan from non-institutional 
sources was highest in Pondicherry, at 7.3 percent (Table 8). This implies that access to credit 
is extremely limited for unorganised enterprises in rural areas. 
Table 8: Number per 1000 of rural enterprises by source of loans, by states and all India, 
2005-06 
State/Union Territory 
Loans 
Total 
estimated no. 
of enterprises 
Institutional Non-institutional 
Andhra Pradesh 51 37 1085242 
Arunachal Pradesh 4 2 541 
Assam 4 5 333006 
Bihar 6 4 663379 
Chhattisgarh 15 7 172610 
Delhi 67 18 3639 
Goa 167 19 4546 
Gujarat 26 4 300753 
Haryana 54 11 119687 
Himachal Pradesh 75 11 100437 
Jammu & Kashmir 7 2 140468 
Jharkhand 13 3 540250 
Karnataka 46 25 663211 
Kerala 133 49 492777 
Madhya Pradesh 15 7 564463 
Maharashtra 92 51 556168 
Manipur 11 8 35797 
Meghalaya 0 0 34513 
Mizoram 17 0 3291 
Nagaland 17 34 7167 
Orissa 14 11 870877 
Punjab 27 5 150208 
Rajasthan 28 9 400875 
Sikkim 15 0 3684 
Tamil Nadu 24 45 850353 
Tripura 11 10 38900 
Uttaranchal 60 3 53940 
Uttar Pradesh 15 8 1704516 
West Bengal 14 20 2223768 
A & N Islands 82 37 1872 
Chandigarh 95 0 753 
D & N Haveli 230 0 797 
Daman & Diu 3 0 1464 
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Lakshadweep 18 47 255 
Pondicherry 118 73 4058 
All India 30 19 12128266 
Source: NSSO (2007) 
 
An analysis at the level of each manufacturing industry in each state further shows that the 
highest amount of loan from moneylenders is taken in Chandigarh, followed by Delhi (Table 
9). States and Union territories such as, Mizoram, Nagaland, Goa, Jharkhand, Sikkim, Daman 
and Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli do not have predominance of moneylenders.  The 
interesting feature that emerges from this analysis is that, the prevalence of typical 
moneylenders is lower in those states where apart from formal institutions, credit is also 
available from the suppliers or contractors.  In such a situation it may be interesting to 
identify the type of contracts that the owner of the enterprises enters into with the suppliers 
and contractor, in view of the high volatility that these units are usually exposed to. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, according to the reports of National Commission for Enterprises 
in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS, 2009) the overall availability of credit to the small  
unorganised enterprises as percentage of net bank credit (NBC) of the scheduled commercial 
banks has declined from 15.5 percent in 1996-97 to 6.6 percent in 2007-08. NCEUS finds 
that the growth in credit to the small-scale industry (SSI) that includes the micro enterprises 
or informal sector enterprises has not kept pace with the growth in NBC. In 2007-08, the 
share of SSI credit was only 6.6 percent of NBC compared to 15.2 percent in 1994-95 (Table 
10). 
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Table 9: Outstanding loans per rural manufacturing enterprise on the date of survey and 
annual interest payable per enterprise by source agency of loan for each State/UTs (in Rs), 
2005-06 
State/UT 
central and 
state level 
lending 
institution 
Other 
institutional 
agencies 
Money lenders Business partner Supplier/ 
contractor 
 
amou
nt 
intere
st Amount interest amount interest amount interest amount interest 
Andhra 
Pradesh 853 217 210 28 641 181 510 61 90 11 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 7391 355 0 0 9 0 0 0 1715 133 
Assam 361 63 104 16 81 88 3 2 15 1 
Bihar 120 22 0 0 7 4 0 0 5 3 
Chhattisgar
h 
1918
7 2499 21 3 205 264 769 45 2 0 
Delhi 43765 19699 18 7 5897 530 0 0 0 0 
Goa 124854 16880 4445 629 0 0 0 0 934 0 
Gujarat 833 247 567 645 209 14 254 26 0 0 
Haryana 23003 3197 2348 264 4134 3479 4549 503 1337 60 
Himachal 
Pradesh 5475 1623 483 127 214 32 205 39 89 7 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 705 95 67 66 0 0 2 1 280 2 
Jharkhand 189 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Karnataka 1948 540 109 33 175 63 1 0 9 0 
Kerala 12892 1615 13622 838 1947 485 19 2 301 7 
Madhya 
Pradesh  1384 476 5 1 147 125 116 8 40 3 
Maharashtra 7449 1260 319 85 160 80 1124 124 117 3 
Manipur 0 0 4 3 85 51 0 0 0 0 
Meghalaya 45 33 4 3 4 3 0 0 0 0 
Mizoram 1567 331 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nagaland 150 87 0 0 0 0 1 1 229 0 
Orissa 571 82 196 24 111 25 0 0 3 0 
Punjab 4055 571 69 44 693 93 262 31 30 1 
Rajasthan 2303 465 671 50 1953 472 382 34 16 4 
Sikkim 2828 741 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Tamil Nadu 3016 893 317 166 1586 416 120 12 33 3 
Tripura 963 569 0 0 62 23 29 0 102 0 
Uttaranchal 16337 2657 0 0 24 7 167 5 0 0 
Uttar 
Pradesh 723 292 2 2 174 87 134 61 88 0 
West 
Bengal 1611 253 164 9 102 55 47 7 109 17 
A & N 
islands 5500 543 0 0 235 118 0 0 3 0 
Chandigarh 1909 10981 0 0 8219 54795 0 0 0 0 
D & N 
Haveli 280 83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Daman & 
Diu 43 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lakshadwee
p 105 11 0 0 2343 844 0 0 0 0 
Pondicherry 84404 9585 18889 2351 5504 852 12 1 487 0 
All India 2654 495 736 82 454 164 220 30 83 6 
Source: NSSO (2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Flow of Credit from Commercial Banks to SSI Sector, (1994 – 2008) 
Year 
Net Bank 
Credit (Rs. 
Crore) 
Annual 
Growth 
(%) 
Credit to 
SSI (Rs. 
Crore) 
Annual 
Growth 
(%) 
SSI credit 
as % of 
NBC 
1994-95 192424 - 29175 - 15.2 
1995-96 228198 18.6 34246 17.4 15 
1996-97 245999 7.8 38196 11.5 15.5 
1997-98 297265 20.8 45771 19.8 15.4 
1998-99 339477 14.2 51679 12.9 15.2 
1999-2000 398205 17.3 57035 10.4 14.3 
2000-01 467206 17.3 60141 5.4 12.9 
2001-02 535063 14.5 67107 11.6 12.5 
2002-03 668576 25 64707 -3.6 9.7 
2003-04 664244 -0.6 71209 10 10.7 
2004-05 877708 32.1 76592 7.6 8.7 
2005-06 1266689 44.3 101285 32.2 8 
2006-07 1763709 39.2 127323 25.7 7.2 
2007-08 2361913 39.2 155804 22 6.6 
  
 
 
25 
Source: NCEUS (2009) 
 
Next, we compare the per worker value of total emoluments, outstanding loans, gross value 
added (GVA), fixed capital and assets of the organized as well as the unorganized 
manufacturing sectors. Not surprisingly, we observe that the proportion of outstanding loans 
compared to GVA and the fixed assets of the unorganized sector is much lower than that of 
the organized sector.  It also shows that the total emolument per worker is proportionately 
high for the organized sector (Table 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Per worker details of rural unorganized sector and the organized sector (2005-06) 
State / UT 
Total Emoluments* Outstanding Loans GVA Fixed Capital/Fixed Asset 
Un 
organized Organized 
Un 
organized Organized 
Un 
organized Organized 
Un 
organized Organized 
Andhra 
Pradesh 3434 64341 1293 341888 19540 175588 17998 479734 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 13995 N.A. 2471 N.A. 199637 N.A. 46361 N.A. 
Assam 3254 55315 491 258245 20341 276560 12401 683445 
Bihar 542 51409 97 688241 14882 30764 13980 513791 
Chhattisgarh 3047 171672 9742 956978 18719 700127 19200 1867088 
Delhi 77022 127136 11581 266946 4432648 274610 113879 298318 
Goa 25604 153824 45192 769611 143609 973248 124249 1308519 
Gujarat 7493 113944 1180 773064 46391 568555 21210 1785980 
Haryana 12695 118367 22154 275060 73667 374605 79371 605874 
Himachal 
Pradesh 4896 121474 4982 1060384 17649 1210626 47108 1947297 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 3174 65621 1132 271379 43907 280565 35471 362363 
Jharkhand 1188 198748 125 508594 12845 967791 8543 1655050 
Karnataka 6090 112845 1265 486579 33482 348158 21960 876363 
Kerala 12926 66150 14784 135560 31360 127906 46930 265816 
Madhya 
Pradesh 2553 108824 919 602728 18329 344410 12345 1146271 
Maharashtra 8829 17212 6096 721630 46895 735241 36145 1159745 
Manipur 3524 23414 108 30969 19712 52191 22174 48847 
Meghalaya 10843 81594 73 516074 36281 556108 14877 892088 
Mizoram 3097 N.A. 1042 N.A. 40111 N.A. 27583 N.A. 
Nagaland 1533 33483 1122 152587 34786 134868 31039 118045 
Orissa 1037 127377 476 927352 8646 437987 5471 2141695 
Punjab 5146 73390 3961 246105 46644 150790 57405 397032 
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Rajasthan 8476 88929 3331 484314 39564 284077 28357 715368 
Sikkim 8589 N.A. 1733 N.A. 55941 N.A. 40857 N.A. 
Tamil Nadu 8891 78357 2492 354413 36482 199022 33040 541468 
Tripura 13896 20824 402 52438 27366 57718 5137 70159 
Uttaranchal 10462 124927 9697 374417 27265 579428 48029 783538 
Uttar Pradesh 3216 96999 704 482457 18896 260486 16331 751805 
West Bengal 3094 98800 1303 620359 13965 171590 1073 629964 
A & N 
Islands 18666 91844 10876 1637589 49915 -36170 58411 2590071 
Chandigarh 17260 166129 5232 487966 70894 267787 148319 553507 
D & N 
Haveli 16613 98727 139 1073063 48507 541344 38309 1310824 
Daman & 
Diu 32866 105844 10 400933 145257 700457 73911 677400 
Lakshadweep 11106 N.A. 1645 N.A. 34316 N.A. 21541 N.A. 
Pondicherry 24560 115274 30160 331332 326083 840490 180059 705245 
Note: (a) * = Total emoluments are calculated for all workers at the rates obtained by hired workers. 
          (b) N.A. = Not Available.  
Source: calculated from NSSO and ASI data. 
 
 
One of the interesting results that we come across is that in all the states and union territories 
the ‗ratio of GVA to outstanding loans‘ as well as ‗ratio of fixed assets to outstanding loans‘ 
is much higher in the informal sector compared to the formal sector.4  Despite the fact that the 
gross value added and the value of fixed assets are often quite significant in the informal 
sector (Table 12), the existence of such a sector in the grey area between legality and 
illegality usually hinders free flow of formal capital.  If the problem of interpretation that 
comes with the legal ambivalence of the informal sector could be minimized via appropriate 
institutional interventions, it may also be possible to use the fixed assets per informal unit as 
collateral against loans.  In fact, for the states and union territories such as, Bihar, Jharkhand, 
Meghalaya, Manipur, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, fixed assets belonging to 
informal enterprises seem much better than what is reflected by their realized 
creditworthiness. The same applies if one analyses the GVA to outstanding loans in such 
enterprises. Overall, it seems that the problem of interpretation significantly stifles the access 
to credit for rural enterprises located in the informal sphere.  
Table 12: Per worker ratio of GVA and fixed capital/fixed assets to outstanding loans for 
organized and unorganized sector, 2005-06 
State / UT 
Fixed capital or 
asset/Loans GVA/Loans 
Unorganized Organized Unorganized Organized 
Andhra Pradesh 13.9 1.4 15.1 0.5 
Arunachal Pradesh 18.8 N.A. 80.8 N.A. 
Assam 25.2 2.6 41.4 1.1 
Bihar 143.6 0.7 152.8 0.0 
Chhattisgarh 2.0 2.0 1.9 0.7 
Delhi 9.8 1.1 382.8 1.0 
Goa 2.7 1.7 3.2 1.3 
Gujarat 18.0 2.3 39.3 0.7 
Haryana 3.6 2.2 3.3 1.4 
Himachal Pradesh 9.5 1.8 3.5 1.1 
Jammu & Kashmir 31.3 1.3 38.8 1.0 
Jharkhand 68.4 3.3 102.8 1.9 
Karnataka 17.4 1.8 26.5 0.7 
                                         
 
4 In the absence of  data on amounts of  loan taken, we consider outstanding loans as a proxy for the amount of  loan 
obtained by the enterprises. 
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Kerala 3.2 2.0 2.1 0.9 
Madhya Pradesh 13.4 1.9 19.9 0.6 
Maharashtra 5.9 1.6 7.7 1.0 
Manipur 205.2 1.6 182.4 1.7 
Meghalaya 202.8 1.7 494.6 1.1 
Mizoram 26.5 N.A. 38.5 N.A. 
Nagaland 27.7 0.8 31.0 0.9 
Orissa 11.5 2.3 18.2 0.5 
Punjab 14.5 1.6 11.8 0.6 
Rajasthan 8.5 1.5 11.9 0.6 
Sikkim 23.6 N.A. 32.3 N.A. 
Tamil Nadu 13.3 1.5 14.6 0.6 
Tripura 12.8 1.3 68.0 1.1 
Uttaranchal 5.0 2.1 2.8 1.5 
Uttar Pradesh 23.2 1.6 26.8 0.5 
West Bengal 0.8 1.0 10.7 0.3 
A & N Islands 5.4 1.6 4.6 0.0 
Chandigarh 28.3 1.1 13.5 0.5 
D & N Haveli 275.5 1.2 348.9 0.5 
Daman & Diu 7515.3 1.7 14769.8 1.7 
Lakshadweep 13.1 N.A. 20.9 N.A. 
Pondicherry 6.0 2.1 10.8 2.5 
Source: calculated from NSSO and ASI data. 
 
4. Volatility in the Rural Informal Sector 
 
It has been discussed above that the business of lending to the rural informal 
organizations is a high-risk proposition for banks. Uncertainty with regard to income sources 
of rural informal sector and evaluating their assets remain the foremost predicament for 
banks.  The repayment capacity of rural borrowers, with their irregular and volatile income 
streams and expenditure patterns is also of serious concern that the formal lending agencies 
cannot ignore.  Secondly, the transaction costs of rural lending in a country like India are 
high, mainly due to small loan sizes, the high frequency of transactions, the large 
geographical spread, the heterogeneity of borrowers, and widespread illiteracy. Thirdly, 
collaterals, which the rural borrowers lack, usually push them out of the purview of formal 
lending institutions. The borrowers from the rural informal sector either keep the output 
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produced as collateral or their land. As we have already discussed, the volatility of crops (for 
cultivators) and manufacturing goods (for owners of small manufacturing enterprises) make 
them unacceptable to banks. Fourthly, the government‘s policies have worsened the lending 
conditions facing the banks in general, and in rural areas in particular. High fiscal deficits and 
statutory preemptions imposed on banks crowd out credit to the private sector. Persistent 
interest rate restrictions—floors on short-term deposit rates and lending rates, ceiling on 
small loans, etc. act like ―implicit tax‖ on banks (Basu, 2006).  
 
From the perspective of the rural poor too, dealing with formal sector banks prove to be 
immensely complex and problematic. Firstly, rural banks lack the flexibility of providing 
loans for goods and services that form the consumption basket given the diminutive income 
and expenditure patterns of small rural borrowers. Secondly, the transaction costs of dealing 
with formal banks are high. Procedures for opening an account or seeking a loan are 
cumbersome and costly (with high rejection rates). It is indicated by RFAS (2003) that clients 
often have to pay hefty bribes (ranging from 10 to 20 percent of the loan amount) to receive a 
loan. This makes the ultimate cost to borrowers very high.  It takes, on average, thirty-three 
weeks for a loan to be approved by a commercial bank.  Moreover, the predominance of land 
as collateral automatically excludes a huge section of tenant cultivators and marginal 
cultivators. 
 
While much has been written about the lack of credit facility for agriculture in general, the 
reasons behind the lack of credit offered to rural manufacturing sector are relatively under-
explored.  One conjecture, as we have discussed in the preceding sections is the uncertainty 
of output and the associated transaction costs which could be an important reason behind the 
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lack of access to credit. What we offer next, therefore, is a brief account of the extent of 
volatility of the rural informal manufacturing organizations in India to identify the reasons 
behind their lack of access to formal credits. Clearly, this is only one of the possible barriers 
facing formal financial institutions, the more well-known ones have been studied in 
substantial detail in various places. 
 
Measuring Income Volatility of Rural Manufacturing Enterprises 
To identify what exactly causes the banks to consider unorganized manufacturing enterprises 
as unworthy creditors, we tried to obtain an indicator of volatility of the unorganized 
manufacturing industries.  To this end, we calculate the coefficient of variation in the fixed 
assets and gross value added (GVA) of the unorganized manufacturing industries between 
2000-01 and 2005-06. This measure of dispersion helps us to identify the industry groups 
which have a volatile asset base and a volatile production base.  It is well known that the 
coefficient of variation measures the extent of variability in relation to the mean of the 
population. The coefficient of variation is computed only for data measured on a ratio scale, 
which are measurements that can only take non-negative values. 
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Table 13: Measure of Volatility of Fixed Assets and GVA, by industry. 
Industry 
Coefficient 
of variation 
of assets 
Coefficient of 
variation of 
GVA 
Cotton ginning, cleaning and baling 0.19 1.21 
Food products and beverages 0.33 0.47 
Tobacco products 0.00 0.25 
Textiles 0.26 0.50 
Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur 0.17 0.53 
Tanning and dressing of leather 0.45 0.71 
Wood and of products of wood and cork 0.36 0.10 
Paper and paper products 0.42 1.06 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of 
recorded media 0.38 1.07 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear 
fuel 0.58 0.65 
Chemicals and chemical products 0.12 0.72 
Rubber and plastic products 0.54 0.83 
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.04 0.35 
Basic metals 0.82 0.85 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 0.42 0.64 
Machinery and equipment N.E.C 0.44 0.72 
Electrical machinery and apparatus N.E.C 0.23 1.05 
Radio, television and communication  equipment 0.80 1.32 
Medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks 0.80 1.18 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.30 1.24 
Other transport equipment 0.54 0.67 
Furniture, Manufacturing N.E.C 0.42 0.81 
Recycling 1.12 1.09 
Note: N.E.C. =Not elsewhere classified. 
Source: Own calculations from NSSO data. 
 
Table 13 shows that across various industry classifications, the degree of volatility is quite 
high in terms of the GVA.  Industries such as cotton ginning, cleaning and baling, publishing, 
printing and reproduction of recorded media, electrical machinery and apparatus, radio, 
television and communication equipments, medical precision and optical instruments, motor 
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vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, recycling show high volatility in their gross value added 
over the years.5 On the other hand, industries as paper and paper products, tanning and 
dressing of leather, coke (coal), refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, radio, television 
and communication equipments, medical precision and optical instruments, recycling have 
high volatility in their fixed asset base. Comparing these with the loans outstanding for each 
enterprise by source agencies for each industry (see appendix table A.1), we observe that the 
industries for which the availability of loans are low are also the ones which have a volatile 
asset base and are seldom the ones which have highly volatile GVA. Thus, it seems banks, 
while lending, tend to consider the asset base of these enterprises more important than their 
GVA.  Since in case of informal manufacturing units banks can not hold output as collateral 
they tend to offer loans on the basis of the fixed assets of the units.  Therefore, it can be 
concluded, at least from this exercise, that while volatility of GVA does not significantly 
explain the lower availability of loans to informal enterprises6, the volatility in the asset base 
may be responsible for the lack of access to formal credit. As the asset base of the rural 
unorganized manufacturing industries are quite low and volatile at the same time, the banks 
in turn do not consider them creditworthy.  It seems that in order to help these industries grow 
the government may play the role of a guarantor.  It involves some risk-sharing arrangements 
between the banks and the governments and may turn out to be a better policy than loan 
write-offs or subsidies en mass that the government often pursues.  It certainly requires more 
efficient and dedicated bureaucratic interference and management, which does not seem a 
                                         
 
5 Note that, these classifications of  rural industries are directly obtained from the NSSO surveys of  rural informal 
manufacturing sector in India.  
6 Here we are not looking into the general equilibrium aspects of  linkages between rural industries and other sectors 
as agriculture. Therefore we do not delve into the causes of  volatility of  GVA of  unorganised manufacturing sector 
and consider the source of  volatility to be exogenous. 
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stumbling block given the vividly laid out rural and panchayat (local self-government) 
institutions in India.  It may also device contracts or schemes specifically for the rural 
manufacturing sector to supply banks with greater information and hence, greater confidence 
on the borrowers. 
Given the current trend of shifting from agriculture to manufacturing and services, it is also 
evident that rural unorganized manufacturing sector forms the spine of the rural economy.  In 
such a situation, the government must facilitate the credit accessibility of these industries 
from banks and cooperatives.  
 
 
5. The Micro-credit Linkage and Concluding Remarks 
On the more traditional front, to mitigate some of the persistent obstructions in 
accessing credit in rural India, the role of micro credit or the system of peer-group lending 
seems to be a convenient way to nullify the problem of moral hazard pertaining to individual 
creditworthiness of the rural mass. Therefore, it is no surprise that in the absence of dedicated 
information, historically micro credit became an important avenue through which the 
government has tried to provide easy credit to the rural poor. In the event of withdrawal of 
formal banks from rural areas, the link between banks and self-help groups ensures some 
relief in terms of access to cheap credit. The increased financial alienation of the rural poor 
and its consequent effect on poverty and inequality led the government to launch a pilot 
program by NABARD in 1992, in an endeavor to increase the outreach of formal lending 
institutions, by linking 255 Self Help Groups (SHGs) with commercial banks. Apart from the 
direct institutional loans provided to the unorganized sector, micro credit entails a flow of 
indirect credit that is made available to unorganized sector enterprises (NCEUS, 2009). Micro 
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credit is mainly disbursed through two different sources, first through SHG-Bank Linkage 
Programme and the second through Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs)7. While over 84 
percent of micro credit is through SHG-bank linkage, remaining 16 percent of micro credit is 
routed through the MFIs (NCEUS, 2009).  Therefore, officially micro credit remains an 
important linkage between formal sources of loan and the unorganised sector.8 However, data 
on micro credit, other than those provided by official sources, remains scarce and erratic. 
Nonetheless, almost all sources agree to an increase in share of micro finance over the last 
two decades. Presently, we do not have the scope to discuss the role of micro credit in much 
detail. 
                                         
 
7 The government had also started the Swarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana in SHG method since April, 1999. 
Under this scheme, credit is provided to SHGs formed by the rural poor to establish micro enterprises (GoI, 2008). 
 
8 Note that, micro credits are often used for personal consumption rather than production. See Coleman (1999), 
Kaboski and Townsend (2005), McKernan (2002); Pitt, Khandker, Chowdury, and Millimet (2003), and Pitt and 
Khandker (1998) for developing countries in general. These studies focus on micro entrepreneurial credit rather than 
consumer credit. However, it appears that there are strong overlaps between small, closely-held businesses and the 
households that run them. This gives rise to the possibility that micro entrepreneurial loans are often used for 
consumption smoothing (Morduch 1998; 1999). 
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Table 14: Number of Self Help Groups financed by banks and the amount of loan disbursed 
under the SHG-bank linkage program, (Number and Rs. Crore) 
Years No. of SHGs financed by banks Bank Loan 
1992-93 255 0.29 
1993-94 365 0.36 
1994-95 1502 1.79 
1995-96 2635 3.62 
1996-97 3841 5.78 
1997-98 5719 11.92 
1998-99 18678 33.31 
1999-00 81780 135.91 
2000-01 149050 287.89 
2001-02 197653 545.47 
2002-03 255882 1022.33 
2003-04 361731 1855.53 
2004-05 539365 2994.26 
2005-06 620109 4499 
2006-07 1105749 6570 
2007-08 1227770 8849.26 
2008-09 1609586 12253.51 
2009-10 1586822 14453.3 
2010-11 1196134 14547.73 
Source: NABARD 
 
In spite of the fact that SHGs helped credit outreach to the rural poor extensively, and helped 
ensure a more stable business and livelihood, performance of SHGs remain a moot subject. 
The existence of private players who provides micro credit apart from the commercial banks 
are often reported to have led to exploitation of the members of the SHGs by charging 
usurious rates of interest.  In fact, studies on the performance of microfinance remain diverse. 
Some have cited equity, outreach and good recovery rate as the major affirmative aspects of 
the SHGs, whereas several others indicate the exploitative effects of usurious rates of interest 
that it charges. 
It should be remembered, however, that microcredit through self-help groups do not 
automatically address the problems of enforcement and collateral directly and therefore the 
peer lending effect, that it is founded on, might not generate the desired outcomes in many 
  
 
 
37 
cases.  It nevertheless, lowers the burden of moral hazard quite successfully as has been 
epitomized by the success of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.  On the same note, the 
functioning of microcredit as the most vibrant link between formal credit and rural 
unorganized industries may suffer from institutional inefficiencies, whereby the credit 
disbursement mechanism may itself be faulty and biased.  In a well-known study for the 
Philippines, Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006) show that microfinance was targeted only to the 
already established units, neglecting the prospective businesses completely in the process.  
Consequently, these units got access to more capital, made more profits and even laid-off the 
relatives and dependents who they initially considered as social responsibility.  
The present paper therefore, discussed many such findings and tried to delineate the 
linkage between rural unorganized sector and the sources of formal finance.  We also offered 
a cross-industry study of the degree of volatility faced by rural unorganized firms and how 
that might affect access to finance.  Interestingly, the volatility of the assets base in rural 
unorganized sector appears to be a major stumbling block as to why the formal lending 
agencies do not find them attractive.  In this regard, we wish to reiterate that for developing 
countries like India, there is a long-standing problem of the enforcement of property and legal 
rights, which has a strong bearing on the functioning of businesses and entrepreneurship and 
consequently the access to credits and formal linkages.  The not-so-unusual business, 
bureaucracy and corruption nexus often helps to bypass the problems of rights and 
enforcement in poor countries via use of money or power.  However, the general condition 
remains worrisome.  It is hard to see how the economic environment of a country can 
continue to remain de-linked from pressing aspects in legality and governance which seems 
to be at the core of the formal-informal argument critically influencing the observed 
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production organization associated with it.  These highlight some of the directions in which 
this debate may enrich itself for the developing countries in general.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: Outstanding Loan per Enterprise on Date of Survey by Source Agency of Loan for Each Industry, Rural India, 2005-06 (Rs.) 
Industry 
Central and 
state level 
lending 
institution 
Other 
institutional 
agencies 
Money 
lenders 
Business 
partner 
Supplier/ 
Contractor 
Friends and 
Relatives Others Total 
Cotton ginning, cleaning and baling 7915 0 954 91 2162 760 0 11882 
Food products and beverages 4664 3387 821 349 182 583 334 10320 
Tobacco products 20 0 22 0 2 1 1 47 
Textiles 2046 57 315 2 83 228 32 2763 
Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur 457 81 92 10 9 97 2 749 
Tanning and dressing of leather 2075 0 1012 0 44 55 40 3225 
Wood and of products of wood and cork 499 76 182 18 29 83 16 903 
Paper and paper products 3734 29 212 3245 36 1038 1 8296 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of 
recorded media 14439 827 3111 553 9 2156 333 21428 
Coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 69918 0 2191 0 0 115 9751 81974 
Chemicals and chemical products 5029 1177 654 21 250 1505 212 8848 
Rubber and plastic products 68530 12801 4927 9818 1411 23352 457 121296 
Other non-metallic mineral products 6432 1044 2389 826 83 830 610 12214 
Basic metals 221303 5287 13829 8373 5768 5808 2121 262489 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment 5168 210 387 12 48 559 24 6407 
Machinery and equipment N.E.C 3544 324 601 1153 500 3479 271 9873 
Electrical machinery and apparatus N.E.C 14310 220 794 11850 756 778 401 29110 
Radio, television and communication  
equipment 406133 0 11743 0 0 2 0 417878 
Medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks 157052 455 1374 0 3195 15338 75 177488 
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Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 81394 1800 5809 0 0 6828 0 95832 
Other transport equipment 7443 7 889 0 8 1847 370 10563 
Furniture, Manufacturing N.E.C 3154 88 842 28 98 540 102 4852 
Recycling 6460 0 2798 0 0 390 0 9647 
Source: NSSO. 
 A.2 The definition of factories in Factories Act, 1948, is as follows (also adopted by NSSO): 
 
2m (i) and 2m (ii) of Factories Act, 1948 describes a "factory" as any premises including the precincts thereof- 
 
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a 
manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or  
 
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a 
manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, but does not include a mine subject to the 
operation of 3[the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952),] or 4[a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, a railway running shed or a 
hotel, restaurant or eating place]. 
